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SEOUL, Newspim — “‘Recruiters of borrowed-name bank accounts,’ ‘collection couriers,’ ‘cash withdrawal operatives,’ and ‘money laundering operatives’ are scattered like separate dots, so even if they are arrested individually in Korea, it is difficult to ultimately stop the crimes of the organization itself.”

Attorney Chon Hyeong Hwan of Mega-X Law Office, which has offices in Korea and Thailand, explained the structural characteristics of overseas voice phishing organizations on the 24th and pointed out the limitations of investigations. Voice phishing organizations based overseas have operated in the form of “cell-like organizations,” avoiding compulsory investigation methods available to domestic investigative authorities.

(Omitted)

The following is a Q&A with the attorneys.

What do you see as the difficulties in domestic investigations of overseas-operated voice phishing call center cases?

Attorney Chon: The key point is that “the base is overseas.” In Korea, investigative authorities can investigate an organization by tracing account flows and communications or by using various compulsory investigation methods. However, because recruiters of borrowed-name bank accounts, collection couriers, cash withdrawal operatives, and money laundering operatives are scattered like dots, it is difficult to stop the entire organization even if they are arrested individually in Korea. There are also many cases where they immediately move to another country and reorganize to evade the investigation network.

Are there cases involving Koreans active overseas, such as in Cambodia, who participated in crimes but are also victims?

Attorney Chon: The so-called “high-paying part-time job” is a representative example. These are cases where people leave Korea thinking it is a simple part-time job, but once they arrive locally, they are instructed to commit illegal acts. However, considering that the organization provides airfare and accommodation, it is unlikely that the work would truly be a simple part-time job. Therefore, the participants may have had some awareness or suspicion that it was a scam crime. Even so, there are clearly cases where they suffer threats, confinement, and assault locally because they fail to meet performance targets.

How do young people in their 20s and 30s become involved in overseas voice phishing organizations, and what do they actually experience there?

Attorney Chon: I have experience representing members of a voice phishing scam group arrested in Thailand last June, known as the “Rungger Company” case. Sentences are being handed down at the Seoul Southern District Court, and additional arrests were made in August, so the cases are continuing.

Looking at these cases, most people were recruited through so-called “high-paying part-time job” offers. In some cases, a participant in his 30s would actively encourage an acquaintance to join, saying, “You can make a lot of money. How can you survive on what you are earning in Korea now?” As a result, people arrive locally, have their passports taken away, become involved in the crime, suffer pressure over performance, and are subjected to various forms of torture.

Most participants in overseas voice phishing organizations are in their 20s. They are offered conditions such as a base salary or a percentage of the criminal proceeds if they achieve results, so some jump in as if they were playing a game. I once visited a detention center where arrested organization members were being held, and a young man who had served as a “cash withdrawal operative” — the person who directly withdraws defrauded money from victims’ accounts — said, “If you go over there and work just a little, you can make KRW 30 million a month. I guarantee it.” I was shocked by how casually they shared their experience of participating in crime and how little remorse they showed.

Why has Southeast Asia become a “holy ground” for voice phishing organizations?

Attorney Chon: The biggest reason is that the structure makes it easy to avoid crackdowns. There is a trend in which organizations that had been operating in China move to places such as Cambodia, where collusion between public authorities and criminals is common. Another factor is that local police do not actively step in because the crimes target foreigners, namely Koreans, rather than their own citizens. In some regions, there are also cases where police collude with organizations for financial gain.

Another problem is that voice phishing proceeds effectively flow into the national economy as if they were part of it. Since foreign currency comes in over a short period of time, there is a perception on the ground that the state is reluctant to actively intervene.

In Thailand, there have also been cases where police and interpreters set conditions such as, “If you pay money, we will get you out,” with interpreters and police sharing profits with criminal organizations. This kind of environment has made parts of Southeast Asia seem like a “safe zone” for voice phishing.

Please explain the procedure for transferring suspects from overseas back to Korea.

Attorney Chon: When a person is arrested overseas, the local police authorities review whether to punish the person locally. If there is no local victim, the person goes through deportation procedures to Korea, and during that process, they stay at a local immigration detention facility.

In Thailand, organization members wait at a facility called the IDC, or Immigration Detention Center. During that process, some people resist because they fear punishment in Korea. However, the detention facility itself is effectively no different from a prison, so it is physically impossible to leave.

The recently arrested large-scale organization in Cambodia was forcibly repatriated through consultation with the local government. In such cases, Korean investigative authorities follow the process of obtaining arrest warrants, securing custody at the airport, and then applying for detention warrants. The organization members are transferred from Korean police holding cells to detention centers and then stand trial.

Local and domestic investigative authorities are cooperating to eradicate overseas voice phishing organizations. What alternatives are needed going forward to eliminate these crimes?

Attorney Chon: Beyond forming a task force, cooperation through a “Korean Desk” — police officers dedicated to crimes involving Koreans who work alongside local police — is necessary.

In the recent Rungger Company case, the arrest was made after the father of a Korean participant reported the matter to the Korean Embassy in Thailand, which prompted the Thai police to move. This shows how important it is to have the power to make local police act.

Cambodia has so far refused to allow a Korean Desk. There are interests involved, such as “black money” derived from criminal proceeds, and the country also does not feel a strong need to step in when both the participants and victims are Korean. Ultimately, however, in order to reduce scam crimes, an institutional channel is needed so that Korean police can conduct operations and field responses together with local police.

(Rest omitted)

Source: Newspim, Reporters Kim Young-eun and Kim Ji-na, “[Voice Phishing in Court] ⑤ ‘Even Individual Arrests Make It Difficult to Wipe Out the Entire Organization’… Field Analysis From Three Attorneys,” November 24, 2025.
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